当事人在商业秘密侵权诉讼中的权利

唐青林


　　诉讼权利是诉讼主体及其他诉讼参加人在诉讼中依法享有的权利，受法律保护。保障当事人的诉讼权利，有利于原告通过法律途径追究被告的法律责任，维护自身的合法权益，也有助于保障处于弱势地位的被告行使合法的权利，降低其合法权益被侵害的风险，从而实现法律的公平和正义。
　　（一）在商业秘密侵权诉讼中原告和被告共同拥有的权利。
　　（1）申请不公开审理的权利。我国《民事诉讼法》第一百二十条规定，人民法院审理民事案件，除涉及国家秘密、个人隐私或者法律另有规定的以外，应当公开进行。离婚案件，涉及商业秘密的案件，当事人申请不公开审理的，可以不公开审理。有关商业秘密侵权案件，当事人为了避免商业秘密的“二次泄露”，申请不公开审理的，法院一般应予准许。
　　（2）提出诉讼管辖异议的权利。我国《民事诉讼法》第三十八条规定，人民法院受理案件后，当事人对管辖权有异议的，应当在提交答辩状期间提出。一般都是原告依照有利于自己的原则，依法选择管辖法院，因此，实际上提出管辖异议的大多数为被告。被告认为原告起诉的法院无管辖权时，可以向该法院提出管辖异议，但应当在提交答辩状期间提出，超过法定期间提出的，法院可以不予受理。当事人对法院作出的管辖权异议裁定不服的，可以依《民事诉讼法》第一百四十条规定在收到裁定书之日起10日内提起上诉。
　　（3）申请回避的权利。我国《民事诉讼法》第十条规定，审理民事案件，法律规定实行回避制度。第四十五条明确规定了审判人员、书记员、翻译人员、鉴定人、勘验人有下列情形之一的，必须回避，当事人有权用口头或者书面方式申请他们回避：是本案当事人或者当事人、诉讼代理人的近亲属；与本案有利害关系；与本案当事人有其他关系，可能影响对案件公正审理的。当事人提出回避申请，应当说明理由，在案件开始审理时提出；回避事由在案件开始审理后知道的，也可以在法庭辩论终结前提出。人民法院对当事人提出的回避申请，应当在申请提出的三日内，以口头或者书面形式作出决定。申请人对决定不服的，可以在接到决定时申请复议一次。
　　（4）申请证据保全的权利。《民事诉讼法》第七十四条规定，在证据可能灭失或者以后难以取得的情况下，诉讼参加人可以向人民法院申请保全证据，人民法院也可以主动采取保全措施。提出诉前证据保全申请，应当以书面形式，且一般应在举证期限届满前提出。在诉前阶段，当商业秘密权利人收集侵权人侵权的证据时，发现侵权人正在积极作为毁灭、转移证据，或者由于证据自身的特性可能灭失的情况，可以申请法院采取诉前证据保全，人民法院受理申请后，审查认为符合诉前证据保全条件的，裁定予以批准，并立即执行。但同时申请人也应当依据法律相关规定缴纳保全费用和提供证据线索。
　　（5）申请财产保全的权利。根据《民事诉讼法》第九十二条至第九十五条的规定，人民法院对于可能因当事人一方的行为或者其他原因，使判决不能执行或者难以执行的案件，可以根据对方当事人的申请，作出财产保全的裁定；当事人没有提出申请的，人民法院在必要时也可以裁定采取财产保全措施。人民法院采取财产保全措施，可以责令申请人提供担保；申请人不提供担保的，驳回申请。人民法院接受申请后，对情况紧急的，必须在四十八小时内作出裁定；裁定采取财产保全措施的，应当立即开始执行。利害关系人因情况紧急，不立即申请财产保全将会使其合法权益受到难以弥补的损害的，可以在起诉前向人民法院申请采取财产保全措施。申请人应当提供担保，不提供担保的，驳回申请。人民法院接受申请后，必须在四十八小时内作出裁定。但申请人在人民法院采取保全措施后十五日内不起诉的，人民法院应当解除财产保全。财产保全限于请求的范围，或者与本案有关的财物。被申请人提供担保的，人民法院应当解除财产保全
　　（6）诉讼和解的权利。《民事诉讼法》第十三条规定了民事诉讼中当事人的处分原则，即当事人有权在法律规定的范围内处分自己的民事权利和诉讼权利。第五十一条规定双方当事人可以自行和解。
除了以上论述的诉讼权利外，当事人在商业秘密侵权诉讼中还有其他基本的权利，如上诉权、法庭辩论权、申请执行权等，在此不再赘述。
　　（二）在商业秘密侵权诉讼中原告权利。
　　原告在商业秘密侵权诉讼中除了享有以上所列举的权利外，还由于其原告的身份，享有一些其他诉讼参加人不享有的权利。在此就列举三个比较常见的。
　　（1）变更诉讼请求。《民事诉讼法》第五十二条规定原告可以放弃或者变更诉讼请求。变更诉讼请求，是指原告向人民法院起诉后，依法增加或者减少已经提出的实体权利请求。比如，原诉请求商业秘密侵权人支付经济赔偿6000万，后来原告变更请求1亿元人民币的经济赔偿额。原告变更诉讼请求的，人民法院应当对变更后的请求作出裁判。原告变更诉讼请求，应在判决作出前提出。
　　（2）撤回起诉或上诉的权利。《民事诉讼法》第一百三十一条规定，原告有权在案件宣判前申请撤诉，但由人民法院裁定是否准许。人民法院裁定不准许撤诉的，原告经传票传唤，无正当理由拒不到庭的，可以缺席判决。原告有权利依法决定是否通过诉讼程序请求商业秘密侵权人承担法律责任，但原告如果是因为被告的要挟、恐吓等，产生恐惧心理而非自愿去撤诉，法院查明真相后应裁定不予准许，并积极采取措施制止被告的行为。
　　（三）在商业秘密侵权诉讼中被告权利。
　　（1）提起反诉的权利。《民事诉讼法》第五十二条规定被告享有依法提起反诉的诉讼权利。反诉，是指诉讼开始后，本诉的被告人以本诉的原告人为被告提出的具有对抗性的独立的诉讼请求。反诉的目的在于抵消、排斥或者吞并本诉的诉讼请求，有利于保障被告的合法权益。反诉必须在诉讼开始后人民法院作出裁判前提出，且必须向本诉的受诉法院提出。
　　（2）承认或者反驳诉讼请求的权利。《民事诉讼法》第五十二条规定被告可以承认或者反驳诉讼请求。承认诉讼请求，是指被告对于原告提出的实体权利的请求表示认可。反驳诉讼请求，是指被告提出证据或者理由反对原告的诉讼请求。


编者注：本文摘自北京市安中律师事务所唐青林律师主编的《中国侵犯商业秘密案件百案类评》（中国法制出版社出版）。唐青林律师近年来办理了大量侵犯商业秘密的民事案件，为多起涉嫌侵犯商业秘密罪提供辩护，在商业秘密法律领域积累了较丰富的实践经验，欢迎切磋交流，邮箱：lawyer3721@163.com，电话：13910169772。

Reviews on the principle of effective nationality

孙倩
I. Introduction
In a world of ever-increasing transnational interaction, the importance of individual protection during the processes concurrently increases. Nationality is the principal link between individuals and states but also is the bridge connecting individuals with international law. It is just through the linkage of nationality can a person enjoy diplomatic protection by his parent state. But due to double nationality, there are lots of difficulties to effective diplomatic protection of individuals. The principle of effective nationality was formed through the judicial practice of international court of justice. What is the meaning of the principle of effective nationality? Is it a perfect theory in the face of diplomatic protection of dual national? In this article, the author will introduce the concept of this principle and give her opinions on it.
II: The concept of principle of effective nationality
Nationality of an individual is his quality of being a subject of a certain state. Nationality is of critical importance to individuals, especially with regard to individuals abroad or their property. Firstly, it is the main link between individual and a state. It is evidence that one can be protected by his parent state.
Secondly, to some extent, individuals are not the subjects of international law, so they cannot directly enjoy the rights and undertake responsibilities coming from international law. It is through the medium of their nationality that individuals can normally enjoy benefits from international law.
In principle, nationality as a term of local or municipal law is usually determined by the law of particular state. Each state has discretion of determining who is and who is not, to be considered its nationals. However, there is no generally binding rules concerning acquisition and loss of nationality, and as the laws of different states differ in many points relating to this matter, so it is beyond surprising that an individual may process more than one nationality as easily as none at all. But whether each granted nationality owned by these dual nationals has international effects is in doubt. In another word, the determination by each state of the grant of its own nationality is not necessarily to be accepted internationally without question. Especially, when a dual national seeks diplomatic protection in some third state, that state is not answerable to both of states of his nationality but only one of them. In this situation, the third state is entitled to judge which nationality should be recognized.
As stated in Art1 of the Hague Convention of 1930 on certain questions relating to the conflict of nationality laws, while it is for each state to determine under its own law who are its nationals, such law must be recognized by other states only “in so far as it is consistent with international conventions, international custom, and the principle of law generally recognized with regard to nationality”. In the “Nottebohm” case, the International Court of Justice regard nationality as: ‘a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties. It may be upon whom it is conferred, either directly by the law or as a result of an act of the authorities, is in fact more closely connected with the population of the state conferring nationality than with that of any other state’ That is what is called the real and effective nationality. Deriving from the court’s opinion, the principle of effective nationality came into being. The essential parts of effective and real nationality are that which accorded with the facts, which based on stronger factual ties between the person concerned and one of the states whose nationality is involved. Different factors are taken into consideration, and their importance will vary from one case to the next: the habitual residence of the individual concerned is an important factor, but there are other factors such as the centre of his interests, his families, his participation in public life, attachment shown by him for a given country and inculcated in his children, etc. According to this principle, no state is under obligation to recognize a nationality granted not meeting the requirements of it. In the Nottebohm case, International Court of Justice first enunciated this principle and denied Liechtenstein the right to protect Nottebohm.
III． Nottebohm case and reviews on the principle of effective nationality
In the Nottebohm case, involving Liechtenstein and Guatemala, the former sought restitution and compensation on behalf of Nottebohm for the latter’s actions allegedly in violation of international law.
Nottebohm, a German national resident in Guatemala, had large business interest there and in Germany. He also had a brother in Liechtenstein, whom he occasionally visited. While still a German national, Nottebohm applied for naturalization in Liechtenstein on October 9, 1939, shortly after the German invasion of Poland. Relieved of the three-year residence requirements, Nottebohm paid his fees and taxes to Liechtenstein and became a naturalized citizen of Liechtenstein by taking an oath of allegiance on October 20,1939, thereby forfeiting his German nationality under the nationality law of Liechtenstein. He returned to Liechtenstein early in 1949 on a Liechtenstein passport to resume his business activities. At his request, the Guatemalan ministry of External Affairs changed the Nottebohm entry in its Register of Aliens from “German” to “Liechtenstein” national. Shortly afterward a state of war came into existence between the USA and Germany and between Guatemala and Germany. Arrested in Guatemala in 1943, Nottebohm has deported to the USA, where he was interned as an enemy alien until 1946. Upon his release, Nottebohm applied for readmission to Guatemala but was refused; therefore, he took up residence in Liechtenstein. Meanwhile, the Guatemalan government, after classifying him as an enemy alien, expropriated his extensive properties without compensation.
Liechtenstein instituted proceedings against Guatemala in International Court of Justice, asking the court to declare that Guatemala had violated international law “in arresting, detaining, expelling and refusing to readmit Mr. Nottebohm and in seizing and retaining his property”. The court rejected the Liechtenstein claim by a vote of 11 to 3, declaring that Nottebohm’s naturalization could not be accorded international recognition because there was no sufficient “bond of attachment” between Nottebohm and Liechtenstein.
The Nottebohm decision denied the competence of Liechtenstein to protect a naturalized citizen and the loss of Nottebohm could not be remedied. The application of the “genuine link” theory, borrowed from the very different context of dual nationality problems, has the unfortunate effect of depriving an individual of a hearing on the merits and the protection by a state willing to espouse his claim in the transnational arena. The net effect is an immense loss of protection of human rights for individuals. Such a decision runs counter to contemporary community expectations emphasizing the increased protection of human rights for individuals. If the right of protection is abolished, it becomes impossible to consider the merits of certain claims alleging a violation of the rules of international law. If no other state is in a position to exercise diplomatic protection, as in the present case, claims put forward on behalf of an individual, whose nationality is disputed or held to be inoperative on the international level and who enjoys no other nationality, would have to be abandoned. The protection of the individual which is so precarious under the international law would be weakened even further and the author consider that this would be contrary to the basic principle embodied in Article15 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Right. As a matter of human rights, every person should be free to change his nationality. Thus the Universal Declaration of Human Right states that ‘everyone has the right to a nationality’ (Art.15 (1)).The right to a nationality can be interpreted as a positive formulation of the duty to avoid statelessness. The duty to avoid statelessness is laid down in various international instruments, in particular in the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. The term statelessness refers to the “de iure stateless persons” rather than “de-facto stateless persons”. If it is a free choice and if this nationality is to be a benefit rather than a burden to the individual, it should follow that he has the right to renounce one nationality on acquiring a new one. Furthermore, refusal to exercise protection is not accordance with the frequent attempts made at the present time to prevent the increase in the number of cases of stateless persons and provide protection against acts violating the fundamental human rights recognized by international law as a minimum standard, without distinction as to nationality, religion or race. It is unfortunately not the case. While the Nottebohm decision denied the competence of Liechtenstein to protect a naturalized citizen, the Flegenheimer case involved the denial of protection to a national by birth, when and where will the principle of effective nationality be used? This is a question that needs to be thought over. From the standpoint of human rights protection, the application of this principle should be strictly limited.
VI. Conclusion
Nationality is within the domestic jurisdiction of the State, which settles, by its own legislation, the rules relating to the acquisition of its nationality. It is sometimes asserted that there must be a genuine and effective link between an individual and a state in order to establish a nationality which must be accepted by other states. It is doubtful, however, whether the genuine and effective link requirement, used by the International Court of Justice in the Nottebohm-Case in order to deny Liechtenstein’s claim to exercise protection, can be considered as a relevant element for international recognition of nationality or as a requirement of a valid naturalization under public international law. It is frequently argued that in the absence of any recognized criteria the attribution of nationality must be considered as arbitrary and that there must be some kind of a personal and territorial link. The rule, however, although maintained in state practice, has been gradually diminished in its importance due to one exception, which concerning the raising of claims in case of human rights protection, especially to dual nationals who suffers injury in the third state and cannot be protected by his origin nationality state.

References
1, Bauer, O. (2001, first published in 1907). The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
2, ICJRep , 1995, P4, atP23
3, SIR ROBERT JENNINGS & SIR ARTHUR WATTS Oppenheim’s International Law, Longman Group UK LIMITED AND Mrs.Tomokohudso, 1992